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International Law Barring Child
Soldiers in Combat: Problems in
Enforcement and Accountability
Question & Answer Session
From the floor: My first question regards the enforcement mecha-
nisms available for use against non-state actors: There are not many mecha-
nisms for procuring the release of child soldiers other than stigma and
norms. (It seems that those responsible for the use of child soldiers may
not be prosecuted in the International Criminal Court ("I.C.C.") in the near
future.) Are there any mechanisms with teeth that can force non-state
actors to cease their use of child soldiers in armed conflict? My second
question concerns the reporting of violations to the UN: What is the best-
case scenario for a UN response to a negative report? What is a plausible
reaction?
Ms. Vandergrift: We are increasing our efforts to speak to non-state
actors. The problem also arises in the issue of land mines and the Land
Mines Treaty. There is now a non-governmental organization ("NGO")
called the Geneva Call, which works with non-state actors, encouraging
them to be accountable to international norms. In some places, this strat-
egy is being implemented to solve the problems of child soldiering as well
as other children's rights violations. Consider that non-state actors are
fighting not only for power but also for public legitimacy and thus may be
subject to public pressure. Further, the international links between non-
state actors are increasing. In some cases, we have been able to use these
international links to encourage behavior changes. To be sure, this is the
exception, but we have at least begun to experiment in this area. When this
issue first began to be discussed we could not report any progress with
non-state actors whatsoever. Recently, when the Security Council went to
Liberia, they met with the rebel leaders and spoke to them directly about
the use of child soldiers. We are making progress, but we need more crea-
tivity in this area.
In response to the question regarding UN responses to investigations,
it depends in part on the timing of the reporting: If there were reports ear-
lier, there could be nonmilitary responses such as implementing or increas-
ing human rights monitoring. Regular reporting and consistent follow-up
has a positive impact; timely follow-up has been the problem. Further, we
are suggesting that all forces that use children be cut off from military
assistance. If the United States would stop providing military assistance to
all forces that use children, it would send a strong message. Other poten-
tial instruments include conditional community aid and travel bans, but it
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is not clear that these measures are appropriate or effective. One sugges-
tion I have heard is that we should bar the children of leaders who misuse
children from attending school in developed countries. Apparently, not
allowing the children of some leaders out of the country was an effective
tool in the struggle in Nigeria. Of course, those of us who believe in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child are hesitant to punish children for
wrongs committed by their parents. We must at least look at these very
targeted measures and, if we decide to implement them, stick to them. I do
not think there is the political will to use very harsh measures yet.
Ms. Cohn: I will just try to add to what Ms. Vandergrift said. There is
a list of suggested graduated measures in the Secretary-General's recent
report to the Security Council, and it includes things that Ms. Vandergrift
mentioned, from travel restrictions to exclusions from governance struc-
tures to bans on exports of small arms and restrictions on assistance to
parties that recruit or use children. Those measures can be implemented
bilaterally by countries with the leverage and the political will to induce
nonstate actors or states to comply with relevant human rights or child
protection commitments or legal obligations.
You also asked what would be an effective response by the UN. Ms.
Vandergrift made it very clear that there is criticism of how far the UN has
gone to report or monitor child rights violations effectively or to take fur-
ther action. However, I think that one must distinguish between what the
UN Secretariat or agencies can do and what Member States or political UN
organs can do. The political will of Member States and political bodies is
required to implement the measures outlined in the Secretary-General's
report. The UN Secretariat should be urged to articulate country- or actor-
specific recommendations, but the real solution does not lie in the Secreta-
riat of the UN reporting ten pages or one page on what is happening to
children in a given armed conflict. It is for the countries who have leverage
in a particular conflict or with a particular party to a conflict-and they
already know who they are-to do what it takes to achieve the child protec-
tion ends that they have defined as their objective in Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions on children and armed conflict. And it is
unreasonable to ignore the fact that influential states do not have many
competing objectives, and child protection is only one of many concerns.
So, I think that some of the UN critique is accurate, and we can do
better at systematic monitoring and reporting, but more reporting or more
monitoring of abuses will not protect children.
Mr. Southwick: Having worked for the UN, I find it is a wonderful
organization capable of marvelous things. However, it is also one of the
most maddening organizations because of the amount of paper produced
with little result. Thus, it is important to work in the UN, but also at the
national level. For example, signatories to the Optional Protocol are sup-
posed to criminalize behavior that is outlined in the Protocol, such as
recruiting under the age of eighteen. I hope more attention is focused on
some of the measures that can be implemented at the national level.
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From the floor: We have heard arguments for why child soldiers who
committed wrongs in warfare should not be punished for those wrongs.
Does this not create an incentive for warlords of revolutionary groups to
employ child soldiers, knowing that they will not use their military leaders
because of the amnesty for child soldiers? It seems almost as if you have to
punish children for their participation in armed conflicts in order to deter
their further recruitment.
Ms. Cohn: It is a good point. However, I wonder how many armed
groups are likely to make that calculation when in fact they typically enjoy
impunity for their actions. How many child recruiters will be prosecuted
in fact, and how many recruiters will be deterred by a few prosecutions
taking place far away? Will prosecutions deter recruiters who are on a
quest for power and alluvial diamonds?
I certainly think it is important to prosecute those who recruit or use
children in armed conflict. It matters for the child and for their communi-
ties and societies, but I do not count on'these prosecutions having a deter-
rent effect in the short-run. I do think there is merit in attributing
individual criminal responsibility to child soldiers if this can be done
appropriately.
In the debate over the personal jurisdiction of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, the office that I was with took the position that the court's
jurisdiction should extend to those who were fifteen to eighteen at the time
of the alleged crime. We did not actually make an argument along the lines
you suggested, although it is reasonable. We argued that some young peo-
ple did have the capacity to know that their actions were unacceptable.
Further, we argued that, for these youths, it would be beneficial to partici-
pate in a forum where the facts could be ascertained, and, if warranted,
they could be told that they had transgressed the acceptable boundaries of
conduct for society and that rehabilitative measures would be prescribed.
Only rehabilitative dispositions are available to the judges on the Special
Court in the case of a person who was under the age of eighteen at the time
of the crime.
Ms. Vandergrift: We agree that a well-functioning youth justice system
is important. The question is how youth should be held accountable. Dif-
ferent countries have different systems. I think that there are appropriate
ways of holding former child soldiers accountable while still acknowledg-
ing that the children should not have been made to participate in the con-
flict in the first place.
There is an issue of timing, however. For example, in Sierra Leone, the
UN system called for the children to come before the court. Some of us
who were working with child soldiers at that time were quite upset. We
were still trying to get these children out of the bush at that time. A num-
ber of children that we were working with decided to return to the bush
rather than face trial. It would have been better for security in Sierra Leone
if these children had not returned to the bush. In contrast, in Cambodia,
the court process is just beginning -now, many years after the conflict. We
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need to first get the young people to leave fighting forces, disarm them, and
enroll them in a program before we subject them to trials.
Ms. Cohn: I actually would posit that there is widespread misinforma-
tion and misunderstanding about what transitional justice means and for
whom in any country that is in transition from a devastating conflict. I am
quite hard-pressed to believe that child soldiers in Sierra Leone had accu-
rate information and were able to understand what might really happen to
them in the Special Court. I do not even believe that all humanitarian
workers on the ground fully understood what could happen to the child
soldiers who could possibly be involved in court proceedings.
Let me give you an example. First of all, a commander who wants to
keep a child soldier from going to demobilize is going to tell the child that
he will be prosecuted and thrown in jail. The commander has enormous
influence and is an uncontested source of information. He can be
expected to say, "Well, it sounds good to turn yourself in, but they are
going to really punish you." Commanders who want to retain their troops
can be expected to try and scare them with threats of prosecution or retri-
bution even if there is no court on the horizon at all.
NGOs or the United Nations Children's Fund ("UNICEF") might have
communicated accurate information about the nature and possibility of
child involvement in transitional justice processes, at least to the child
soldiers they had access to, including those demobilizing child soldiers
who were already in interim care centers.
So what happened? The Security Council decided to take a trip to
Sierra Leone prior to adopting a resolution on the court's statute. Prior to
the trip and in Sierra Leone, the delegation requested and received a lot of
input from UN and NGO actors that held widely divergent views about
child involvement in the Special Court. When the Security Council's dele-
gation visited former child soldiers in an interim care center, a child of
twelve or fourteen years of age handed the delegation a letter pleading with
the Council not to agree to prosecute these very young, victimized children.
But clearly no child this age could possibly be prosecuted. UNICEF and
the NGOs that were involved with these children and were responsible for
arranging the visit with the Security Council delegation should not have let
a child of that age harbor the irrational and unfounded fear of prosecution.
A twenty-three-year-old who was recruited or enlisted and committed a
crime seven years ago could possibly write something to the Security
Council because he might fear prosecution. No one disagreed about the
experience of children in Sierra Leone, but being a victim of recruitment
does not necessarily absolve a young person from individual criminal
responsibility for all actions they take after they are recruited and so we are
still left wondering: what is the best approach to child involvement in tran-
sitional justice processes?
If very young children left interim care centers, as Ms. Vandergrift sug-
gested, I do not think it is because we, in New York, were having a debate
about juvenile justice and the role of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in
former child soldier rehabilitation. Rather, it is because there is misinfor-
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mation on the ground generally, and from the children's commanders and,
unfortunately, also from humanitarian workers who do not fully under-
stand the debate.
From the floor: Regarding the minimum age for military recruitment,
there is a discrepancy between an age limit that is desirable and one that is
feasible.
Ms. Vandergrift: I am puzzled why the African Charter on the Rights
of the Child sets the minimum age at eighteen if African countries do not
accept it.
From the floor: The answer might be in the more Western-oriented
leadership of Africa as opposed to the tradition and culture of Africa.
Professor Ndulo: Doesn't the minimum recruitment age issue create a
problem of cultural identity? If we accept the argument that an eighteen-
year age limit is not acceptable to the African community on cultural
grounds, even the women's rights convention would be in serious trouble.
How do we reconcile the African position?
From the floor: Ms. Cohn, among your first points was that we should
work more with political and economic experts. Could you elaborate on
how that would be effective?
Ms. Cohn: This juvenile justice question and the role of justice-seeking
mechanisms in child soldier rehabilitation is a good example of an issue on
which specialized expertise was required. I am not a juvenile justice
expert. So, as the debate on the Special Court's personal jurisdiction was
going on, it occurred to me to consult domestic experts. I convened a
panel of juvenile justice and child development practitioners and academ-
ics. They had important things to say about rehabilitation efforts that had
proven successful, or not, in the comparable environment of urban gangs.
Child rights advocates need not themselves be economists or country
analysts, but if we are going to persuade parties to conflicts to refrain from
using children as soldiers or to grant humanitarian access to vulnerable
populations, or convince the World Bank to take measures to advance child
protection, we have to reach out and tap into the right people from a variety
of disciplines and draw on their expertise to make the most compelling
arguments.
Ms. Vandergrift: In Congo, for example, some of us are trying to create
a dialogue with some of the mining firms. There were some Canadian min-
ing firms named in the report that went to the Security Council about the
Congo. I am from Canada as well. In the first meeting, the owner of one of
these mines was not forthcoming, although he did understand us when we
said that mine owners needed to work with us to address the issues facing
the youth of Congo. In the following meeting, however, he admitted to me
that his mine was then in the hands of child soldiers, so we began to dis-
cuss how we could turn the situation around. Mining firms are important
players in these regions. We should endeavor to get these people to con-
tribute to solving the problem of child soldiers. This is one example of
engaging important players and trying to see what they might be able to
contribute to the agenda, in addition to just naming and shaming them.
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Ms. Vandergrift: We have talked a lot about Africa in the last two days.
Those of us working to solve this issue take pains to make clear this is not
just a problem in Africa, and so I would like to make sure that is on the
record. Myanmar has the worst child soldiering situation, judging by the
sheer numbers of child soldiers. Not many NGOs are working there. It is a
very difficult situation to deal with there. We also just released a Watch
List on Colombia. It is important that we not leave the impression that this
is only an African problem. The problem exists in other places in the
world as well.
Professor Ndulo: Thank you very much to all panelists. You provided
us with an excellent analysis of the legal position as well as the problems
and the challenges that are faced by the international community in this
field of child soldiers. Thank you very much.
